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Abstract 
 
 
Although letters of credit are perhaps the most widely used tool in 
international trade, it is surprising how many people including traders get 
confused in some of the essentials of letters of credits. 
Nearly all letters of credit are governed by the (UCP) the Uniform 
Customs and Practices.1 
This thesis discusses the independence principle, beginning with its 
history and development of the letter of credit in the first chapter. Followed 
by a definition and an explanation of the independence principle in the 
second chapter. The third chapter discusses the exceptions to the 
independence principle, starting with the fraud exception following its 
development in the United States of America and the United Kingdom with 
a comparison between the two. Unfortunately, there are few reported cases 
on letters of credit in the Sudan. For this reason, no comparison between the 
law in Sudan and the law in the jurisdictions referred to above as regards to 
letters of credit can be made. This is followed by the discussion of the 
illegality and the mistake exceptions. The fourth chapter (chapter 4) sets 
forth the conclusions to be drawn from the discussions in the previous 
chapters. 
 
  
  
   
 
                                                 
1 In the United States of America letters of credit are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
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Chapter One 
 
 
The History and Development of The Letter of 
Credit 
 
Merchants through history travelled to get new and better goods. For 
this purpose they usually carried large sums of money in order to pay for the 
merchandise they purchase. This made them an easy target for robbers. A 
solution had to be found to this increasing problem. So in the eighteenth 
century, banks issued a formal letter of introduction addressed to the issuing 
banks’ correspondents and agents abroad. This letter of introduction came to 
be known as the “Traveller’s Letter of Credit”. 
The purpose of the “Traveller’s Letter of Credit” was to provide their 
clients with means for obtaining cash from banks abroad for use during their 
foreign travel, thereby  obviating the need to carry large sums of money 
upon their person with the attendant risk of loss or robbery.2 By these letters 
of introduction the agents or correspondents were requested to provide  
every possible assistance. Often copies of these letters were sent ahead of the 
traveller to the correspondents or agents.3 
“The “Traveller’s Letter of Credit” was issued in a form of a letter 
addressed to the correspondents/agents. It indicated that in consideration of 
such correspondents and agents paying cash to the named client, the issuing 
                                                 
2 Wickeremeratne & Rowe (Trade Finance), the complete guide p. 1/3 
3 Wickeremeratne & Rowe ibid p.3 p. 1/4 
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bank would pay bills of exchange drawn by the correspondents/agents on the 
issuing bank for amounts paid plus correspondents/agents charges”.4 
 These letters indicated a maximum amount available under the credit 
and its expiry date. Each correspondent/ agent was required to write down 
the details of each amount paid and its date, so that the next 
correspondent/agent to whom the letter was presented would be able to 
ascertain the balance available under the credit. 
 This continued for a number of years. But as time went by and 
international trade became more and more complex, and it became obvious 
that the “Traveller’s Letter of Credit” was no longer sufficient as a method 
of payment. For one thing trade is not always carried out by persons of 
unblemished repute. In addition the parties are located in, and governed by, 
different systems of law and are unaware of the financial standing, 
credibility, goodwill and solvency of each other. The buyer desires the 
contracted goods on time. He doesn’t desire to pay in advance or on 
shipment, but only after he has satisfactory evidence that the seller has 
shipped the confirming goods on time and that they are beyond the seller’s 
physical control. In addition to that, the buyer does not want to be deprived 
of the use of his capital during the time that elapses between the shipment of 
the goods, their receipt, and their resale.5The seller on the other hand, does 
not want to lock up capital, he may use in business, until the receipt of 
goods. 
 When the goods travel across national borders, they are moved 
outside the jurisdiction on which the seller resides. Once outside the seller’s 
jurisdiction, any attempt to regain control or possession of the goods will be 
                                                 
4 ibid. 
5 ibid. 
 4
significantly more difficult for the seller. Similarly, if the seller does not 
receive payment once the goods are shipped, it will be all the more difficult 
to pursue the buyer for payment, because the buyer and all of his assets will 
probably be outside the seller’s jurisdiction. The seller will deliver goods to 
a foreign jurisdiction where he has little influence, and possibly very little 
knowledge of the applicable law. Foreign law may govern many aspects of 
the transaction including procedures to obtain payment, and the seller may 
be required to obtain any court order necessary to enforce such payment, 
through a foreign forum. This may prove to be inconvenient and expensive.6 
 
 Against the backdrop of the foregoing, it will be recalled that the 
commercial contract is the basic agreement between the seller and the buyer. 
It simply means that the seller undertakes to provide the goods to the buyer, 
and the buyer undertakes to pay the price in return.7  
 The agreement may prescribe for payment of the price in one of the 
following four methods: 
1 Advanced Payment: The seller does not ship the goods before receiving 
payment. 
2 Open Account: The seller ships the goods before receiving payment. 
3 Collection: The seller sends the goods before receiving payment, and the 
buyer pays upon receipt of shipping documents covering the goods or on any 
other terms as stipulated in the collection instruction.8 
 
 In these methods a conflict arises between the interests of the 
contracting parties. In this sense, both the importers and exporters found it 
                                                 
6 Goode “Commercial Law” p.878-879 
7 Wickeremeratne & Rowe op cit p.3p. 2/3 
8 ibid. 
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preferable to improvise a method of payment in which neither the buyer nor 
the seller has the upper hand. A bank as a third party and a letter of credit as 
a method of payment were introduced. 
4 Commercial Credits: in commercial credits the bank undertakes the 
responsibility to the applicant on receipt of confirming documents 
from the beneficiary. Unless otherwise agreed the seller thus has the 
irrevocable undertaking of the issuing bank (or, in case the credit is 
confirmed) of the confirming bank, that he shall be paid if he presents 
the documents stipulated in the credit and, the other terms and 
conditions of the credit have been complied with. 
 Letters of credit are often preferred as the method of payment in 
international trade because they offer a solution to the mismatch between the 
seller’s desire for swift payment and the buyer’s desire of goods first. On the 
other hand, a letter of credit enables the seller to obtain payment from a bank 
within its jurisdiction. The buyer on the other hand, establishes the letter of 
credit in such a manner, that payment is promised on presentation of certain 
documents, the contents of which confirm that  the goods being delivered to 
the buyer are goods that conform to the terms and conditions of the 
underlying sales agreement. The seller only needs to comply with the 
requirements of the credit in order to get paid. This provides comfort to both 
the seller and the buyer by the independent undertaking of banks.9 The 
documentary credit structure provides the seller with an independent bank 
undertaking of payment when he presents the stipulated documents. The 
buyer on the other hand, rests assured that the seller shall not be paid unless 
he presents documentary evidence covering the goods and their shipment. 
                                                 
9 ibid 2/20. 
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 Yet, banks are financial establishments and not traders. They cannot, 
therefore, be made responsible for the conformity of the goods with the 
terms of the underlying agreement. The underlying agreements deal with 
various goods. To make banks responsible for ensuring that the goods 
comply with the underlying agreements, they would have to be experts in all 
the various types of goods, learn the different laws, and study each sales 
contract presented to it. This is why when banks are resorted to pay the price 
of the goods; they were meaning to do that only on the basis of naming 
documents. Fortunately, each step the seller takes, whether it is 
manufacturing the goods, shipping or insuring them, has a document to 
verify it. Examples for documents relating to the goods and their shipment 
are bills of lading, commercial invoices, cargo insurance policies and 
certificates of inspection. The buyer informs the bank that he would like to 
open a letter of credit and instructs it to issue it to a known third party, which 
is known as the beneficiary, stipulating which documents shall be presented 
and which conditions shall be complied with. The buyer will normally 
request the seller to submit clean shipping documents proving that the goods 
have been delivered to a carrier for carriage, and the seller’s commercial 
invoice listing the goods, the quantities, and the price of the goods. The 
buyer may also request the seller to submit an insurance policy, certificates 
to prove quantity or quality, packing lists, and any other documentation 
required to show that the seller has complied with the terms of the 
underlying sales agreement. Accordingly, banks are instructed to pay when 
the seller presents documents confirming with the credit.  
 As mentioned earlier, banks are financial institutions, and it is not 
within their capacity to deal directly and inspect the goods. In addition to 
that banks have a time frame that they are expected to act upon, and decide 
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whether they will keep up the documents or refuse them and inform the 
beneficiary accordingly within a reasonable time, normally not exceeding 
seven banking days following the receipt of the documents10, for all that 
banks deal in documents. This resulted in the banks dealing with the 
documentary credits upon two basic principles:  
1 The Doctrine of Strict Compliance: 
 The documents tendered by the beneficiary must comply strictly on 
their face with the terms and conditions of the credit, in particular with the 
documents stipulated in the credit. This is known as the” The Doctrine of 
Strict Compliance”. Although this is not the subject of this dissertation, but 
it is a very important principle none the less. It gives rise to the 
independence principle and its exceptions. The doctrine of strict compliance 
protects the interest of the paying bank and of the buyer. It assures the buyer 
that the seller shall not be paid unless he presents documents that satisfy the 
requirements contained in the letter of credit. But most importantly, the bank 
is protected in that it is not required to make any judgments as to the 
relevance of the requirements contained in the letter of credit. 
“There is no room for documents which are almost the same, or which will 
do just as well”.11  
 Similarly, Lord Diplock states: 
 “the banker is not concerned whether the documents for which the 
buyer has stipulated serve any useful commercial purpose or as to why the 
customer called for the tender of a document of a particular description. 
Both the issuing bank and his correspondent bank has to make quick 
                                                 
10 Gutridge & Megrah’s Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits  p.144 
11Per Lord Sumner, in Equitable Trust Company of New York v. Dawson Partners Ltd (1927)2 Lloyds’s 
Rep p 49.  this the leading case on strict compliance, it concerned a certificate of quality. A certificate of 
quality was required, signed by “experts”, but was signed by a single expert. The court held that the 
documents were not compliant and the bank had the right to refuse payment. 
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decisions as to whether a document which has been tendered by the seller 
complies with the requirements of a credit.”12 
2 The Independence Principle: 
 The second principle of equal importance is the independence of the 
documentary transaction. This means that the exchange of the documents 
against payment is entirely independent from the commercial transaction, 
i.e., the sales transaction covering the goods. “In documentary credit 
operations, all parties concerned deal with documents and not with 
goods”.13  
 These two principles are of such great importance that the 
International Chamber of Commerce codified them in the UCP. 
 “A credit by its nature is a separate transaction from the sale or other 
contract on which it may be based. Banks are in no way concerned with or 
bound by such contract, even if any reference to it is included in the 
credit.”14 
 “Banks deal in documents and not with goods, services or 
performance to which the documents may relate”15 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Commercial Bank Co of Sidney Ltd v Jalsard Pty Ltd  (1973) AC 279  
13Jacques Saboungi, Special Documentary Credits p.8 
14 UCP 600 Article 4 (a) 
15 UCP 600 Article 5 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
 
The Independence Principle 
 And 
Documentary Compliance  
 
 
Due to the enormous number of commercial credits around the 
world each day, and since the bank has to act swiftly and accurately, all this 
lead to the independence principle being essential in a documentary credit 
transaction.16 In order for the banks to deal swiftly and precisely, the banks 
deal solely in documents, not in goods or whatever those documents may 
relate to17.  It would be absurd to place upon the banks the unreasonable 
responsibility of examining what the documents relate to, or for example to 
examine the fine print in the transport documents.18  
 The core of the independence principle is that banks are only 
concerned with documents and not with goods. Accordingly the seller will 
always receive payment from the bank if he submits documents that strictly 
comply with the credit, regardless of any development in the underlying 
sales agreement, or in the relationship between the buyer and the seller. By 
this, the interests of the seller as of the buyer, already alluded to, will be 
safeguarded.   
                                                 
16 Banks have the maximum of five banking days following the date of presentation to determine if the 
presentation is complying. (article 14 (b)  UCP 600) 
17 Article 5 of the UCP 600 
18 The provisions of the UCP 600 reflect this in article 19(a) (v), article 20 (a) (v), article 21(a) (v),  
article 22 (b), and article 23(a) (vi) 
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 The independence principle is so strongly recognised in international 
commercial trade law and banking practices that the ICC codified it in the 
UCP: 
  
A credit by its nature is a separate transaction from the sale or other 
contract on which it may be based. Banks are in no way concerned or 
bound by such contract, even if any reference whatsoever to it is 
included in the credit.19 
 
The bank’s duty is to examine the documents presented to it under 
the credit and determine, on the basis of the documents alone, whether or not 
the documents appear on their face to constitute a complying presentation.20 
This principle is set out in the Standard Banking Practices for the 
Examination of Documents (SBPED)21 in the following terms: 
*Independence Principle: 
The examiner must determine whether or not the required 
documents comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit 
based solely on examination of the documents on their face. The 
underlying contract of goods or services should have no bearing on 
the examiner’s independent decision regarding the documents’ 
apparent compliance. 
 
 In Westpac Banking Corporation v South Carolina National 
Bank22, Lord Goff said: 
 
                                                 
19 Article 4 Credits v. Contracts  UCP 
20 Article 14 (a) of the UCP 600 
21 Which is published by the International  Financial Services Association  
22 (1986)1 Lloyd’s Rep 311 as quoted by Richard King in Gutteridge & Megrah’s op cit p.181 
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“… It is well settled that a bank which issues a letter of credit is 
concerned with the form of the documents presented to it, and not with the 
underlying facts. It forms no part of the bank’s function, when considering 
whether to pay against the documents presented to it, to speculate about 
underlying facts.” 
 
The courts have even held that the issuing bank is entitled to 
reimbursement or indemnity for the money paid from the buyer even if the 
documents that were presented to it were fraudulently prepared and 
presented by the seller, if on the face of the documents no fraud was 
apparent, and the documents on their face were compliant. In Gian Singh & 
Co Ltd v Banque de L’Indochine 23 the issuing bank debited the buyer’s 
account after paying under a letter of credit which called for “a certificate 
signed by Balwant Singh, holder of a Malaysian passport E-13276, 
certifying that the vessel had been built according to specifications and is in 
fit and proper condition to sail”. It was later discovered that the signature on 
the document on the certificate upon which the bank paid was a forgery. The 
buyer sued the bank for wrongfully debiting his account. The Privy Council 
held that the signature was indeed a forgery but that the certificate was in 
conformity with the requirements of the credit and, accordingly, the buyer 
was bound to reimburse the bank. Lord Diplock said: 
 “In business transactions financed by documentary credits 
banks must be able to act promptly on presentation of the documents. In the 
ordinary case visual inspection of the actual documents presented is all that 
is called for. The bank is under no duty to take any further steps to 
                                                 
23 (1974) 2 Lioyd’s Rep 1 
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investigate the genuineness of a signature which, on the face of it purports to 
be the signature of the person named or described in the letter of credit.”  
 
The ICC has codified this in the UCP. Article 34 of the current edition 
of the UCP (UCP600) states that: 
“A bank assumes no liability or responsibility for the form, 
sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal effect of any 
document…..”24 
As Lord Diplock said in Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v 
Jalsard Pty Ltd 25: 
“The banker is not concerned as to whether the documents for which 
the buyer has stipulated serve any useful commercial purpose, or as to why 
the customer called for tender of a document of a particular description” 
As long as the documents presented are as described, it is not the 
banker’s duty to exercise any sort of judgment as to the need or legal effect 
of those documents, not even to consider whether the bank’s customer’s 
wishes are being carried out. The documents simply have to comply with the 
terms and conditions of the credit in order for the bank to be reimbursed;26 
there is no place for documents that are similar or “almost the same”. 
The leading case of Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson 
Partners Ltd27 is a perfect example of strict compliance. A credit was 
opened is Batavia28 and it required, in addition to the usual documents, a 
“Dutch Government certificate of quality” relating to the goods. The 
                                                 
24 Article 34 of the UCP 600 
25 (1973) AC p.279 
26 This has developed from the general principle of the law of agency, that an agent is only entitled to 
reimbursement from his principal if he acts in accordance with his instructions. 
27 (1927) 27 Ll.L.R.49 
28 Now known as Djakarta  
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Government of the Dutch East Indies did not issue such certificates and the 
credit was, accordingly, varied so that a certificate of quality given by 
“experts” and signed by the Chamber of Commerce in Batavia will be 
acceptable. Two problems arose. First, there was no such thing as the 
Chamber of Commerce in Batavia, there was a body known as the 
Commercial Association of Batavia which discharged the functions that are 
normally carried out by chamber of commerce. Secondly the advice 
forwarded to the correspondent bank in Batavia read “expert” in the singular 
instead of the plural. As a result of all this the documents that were presented 
and taken up by the bank included a certificate signed by one expert only 
and countersigned by the Commercial Association of Batavia. The buyer 
argued that the bank did not comply with its mandate and was not entitled to 
indemnity in respect of the money it has paid in order to take up the drafts. 
The House of Lords held that on the evidence, the Commercial Association 
of Batavia could be regarded as equivalent to the Chamber of Commerce, 
but that the presentation was bad on the ground that a certificate furnished 
by a single expert was not enough. 
Lord Summer said: 
“…the accepting bank can only claim indemnity if the conditions on 
which it is authorised to accept are in the matter of accompanying 
documents strictly observed. There is no room for documents which are 
almost the same, or which will do just as well…The documents tendered 
were not exactly the documents which the defendants had promised to take 
up, and prima facie they were right in refusing them.” 
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It is clear from all the above, that the independence principle and the 
autonomous nature of letters of credit has been articulated in the current 
edition of the UCP, and has been repeatedly upheld in courts. 
In letters of credit, banks have two duties. A duty towards the 
seller/beneficiary to pay him if: 
a the seller presents the documents stipulated in the credit29  
b the terms and conditions of the credit have been complied with. 
A a duty towards the buyer/applicant not to pay unless: 
a the seller presented the documents as stipulated in the credit 
b the seller has complied with the terms and conditions of the credit, 
In fact the issuing/confirming bank is irrevocably bound to honour as 
of the time it issues the credit.30  
This shows that the independence principle is fundamental to the 
efficiency of documentary credits as a method of payment in international 
trade. For this reason, courts in most countries are reluctant to interfere with 
the mechanism of letters of credit and with the concept of autonomy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Article 7(a) UCP600 
30 Article 7(b), 8(c) of the UCP 600 
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Chapter Three 
     
 
The Exceptions to the Independence 
Principle 
   
 
 
A credit by its nature is a separate transaction from the sale or other 
contract on which it may be based. Banks are in no way concerned with or 
bound by such contract, even if any reference whatsoever to it is included in 
the credit.31  
 
 The independence principle is of such importance to documentary 
credit transactions that it has been codified in the UCP. The wording of 
article 4 (a) of the current edition of the UCP (quoted above) suggests that 
the independence principle is absolute, but case law suggests otherwise. 
 The principle itself is treated with great sanctity. However, this 
chapter will show that there are exceptions to this principle. The following 
three exceptions will be discussed: 
1 fraud 
2 unenforceability of the obligation to make payment under the credit or 
illegality affecting such obligation 
3 mutual mistake on the part of the seller and the bank relating to the issue 
of the credit. 
                                                 
31 UCP 600 Article 4 (a) 
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1 Fraud:- 
 
A nominated bank acting on its nomination, a confirming bank, if any, and 
the issuing bank must examine a presentation to determine, on the basis of 
the documents alone, whether or not the documents appear on their face to 
constitute a complying presentation.32 
 
 In order to understand the effect of presentation of fraudulent 
documents to the paying bank under an irrevocable letter of credit, the 
meaning of “fraud” in common law has to be explained. 
 In common law, a misrepresentation is (i) a statement of a fact which 
is (ii) untrue, and which (iii) is  relied upon by the misrepresentee, especially 
by entering into a contract with the representor.33 The common law 
distinguishes between fraudulent and innocent misrepresentations. A 
misrepresentation is considered fraudulent if the maker knows that it is false, 
or is reckless as whether it is true or false. He is considered reckless if he 
does not know whether the statement he is making is true or false, and yet he 
makes it.34 In the leading case of Derry v. Peek35, Lord Herschell 
said:”…Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been 
made 1) knowingly or, 2) without belief in its truth or, 3) recklessly, careless 
whether it be true or false.”36 
 There is no particular definition of fraud in documentary credits, so if 
we apply the definition of fraud in common law to fraud in LC it includes: 
supply of inferior quality of products, wrong quantity of goods, worthless 
                                                 
32 Article 14(a) UCP600 
33 Misrepresentation Act 1967 
34 J.C. Smith, The Law of Contract p.147 
35 (1889)14 AC 337 p. 374 
36 ibid. 
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rubbish, presentment of false shipping documents where no goods were 
shipped, or forgery. 
If fraud is committed, it is either: 
a  Fraud  in the underlying transaction: 
 When a bank examines the documents presented to it under an LC and 
they appear, on their face, to constitute a complying presentation, the bank is 
under a duty to pay.37 In some cases the applicant may suspect fraud in the 
underlying contract, in which case the bank can not interfere since banks are 
in no way concerned with the underlying transactions.38  The applicant in 
this case may apply to the court for an injunction to restrain the bank from 
paying under the credit. The court will not allow the defendant to rely on the 
independence principle.  
b Fraud in the documents presented: 
 The effect of fraudulent documents depends on the nature of the 
document and the state of knowledge of the paying bank. If a beneficiary 
presents documents which are on their face compliant with the terms and 
conditions of the credit, the bank has no option but to pay, unless it can 
establish beyond doubt that the documents were not genuine, or suffering 
from some defect not obvious on the face of them. Here enters the 
importance of the independence principle, if the documents presented 
comply with the credit the bank has to pay even if it has knowledge that the 
seller is, in fact, in breach of the contract of sale.39  However, if the bank 
suspects that the beneficiary is in breach of the contract of sale, the bank 
may advise the applicant to consider getting an injunction. 
                                                 
37 Article 14(a)UCP600 
38 Article 4(a)UCP600 
39 Gutteridge & Megrah opcit p. 167 
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 In general, in order for the bank to refuse payment the fraud has to be 
clearly established and the bank must have knowledge of this fraud before 
payment is made. On the other hand, since the fraud exception is dealt with 
through case law, international jurisdictions differ in their application of  this 
exception. That is why a number of different jurisdictions are worth 
considering to show how different courts and jurisdictions approach the 
fraud exception.  
 In the English leading case of United City Merchants (Investments) 
Ltd and Glass Fibres and Equipment Ltd v. Royal Bank of Canada40, the 
English courts relied heavily in the American case Sztejn v. Henry Schroder 
Banking Corporation41. 
Overall the English case law on the fraud exception is largely based on the 
developments in America. In addition to that, the American system of law 
on Documentary Credits is codified, which serves as a good example of a 
legal system whose documentary credit law is contained in a statute.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 (1983)AC 168 
41 31 NYS 2d 631 (1941) 
 19
A The American Approach: 
 The leading case in the American law is the Sztejn v. Henry Schroder 
Banking Corporation42 . 
In this case the seller had filled50 cases with rubbish instead of the goods 
purchased in terms of the underlying agreement, in order to obtain a bill of 
lading from the carrier, which would reflect that the purchased goods had 
been delivered for carriage. The seller passed his draft for collection to the 
Charted Bank of India, Australia & China, which in due course presented it 
and the documents and obtained an injunction restraining the defendants 
from paying. At the hearing, the beneficiary did not contest the fact that the 
goods delivered were not in fact the goods that were contemplated in the 
agreement of sale. The only issue that was in dispute was whether the 
buyer’s allegations could enable the court to prevent payment on the credit. 
 The defendant argued that since he had presented documents which on 
their face complied with the terms and conditions of the credit, the bank had 
no option, but to pay.  
 The court recognized the independence principle, but made a 
distinction between the situations where certain conditions are breached and, 
where the seller fraudulently presents documents in order to get paid for 
goods that he/she has not shipped. 
 
“It is well established that a letter of credit is independent of the 
primary contract between the buyer and the seller. The issuing bank 
agrees to pay upon presentation of documents, not goods. This rule is 
                                                 
42 31 NYS 2d 631 (1941) as cited by Basil Coustsoudis in the thesis “Letters of credit and the Fraud 
exception ” 
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necessary to preserve the letter of credit as an instrument for the 
financing of trade.”43 
  
 The court rejected the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff lacked a 
course of action, and found that the beneficiary’s fraud was ground for 
granting an injunction stopping the bank from paying the beneficiary under 
the LC. 
Sheintag J said: 
  
 “… where the seller’s fraud has been called to the bank’s attention 
before the draft and documents have been presented for payment, the 
principle of independence of the bank’s obligation under the letter of credit 
should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller” 
 
Sheintag J based this exception on the ex turpi causa non oritur action 
rule (on an illegal cause no action can be based).  
 The importance of the Stzejn case arises from the fact that it is the 
first reported case where the exception was applied. It simply stated that the 
independence principle shall not be extended to protect a seller who is 
seeking to receive payment through conduct which is clearly fraudulent. 
 The question that arises is whether the courts should look at fraud in 
the underlying transaction or on the face of the documents presented. In the 
Stzejn case, the fraud occurred when worthless goods were shipped instead 
of the contracted goods and the documents falsely reflected the delivery of 
confirming goods. The court looked at this as fraud relating to documents. 
 That is to say that the fraud is considered fundamental enough for the 
bank to refuse payment if, in accordance to the doctrine of strict compliance, 
                                                 
43 Per Sheintag J in Sztejnv. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation 31 NYS 2nd 631 (1941) 
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the bank would be entitled to refuse payment if the true position was 
revealed. The distinction of some importance here is the distinction between 
strict compliance in LC and strict contractual principles. In the latter, a 
misrepresentation or fraud has to be material or fundamental in order to 
justify an avoidance of the innocent party’s obligations. But according to the 
doctrine of strict compliance, even the slightest discrepancy in the presented 
documents will be enough for the bank to refuse payment. 
 
 Another American case highlighting the common law fraud under the 
New York law and the UCC is Hyosung America Inc. v Sumagh Textiles 
Co., Ltd44. 
 In this case the Bank of Seoul issued an LC in favour of Sumagh for 
the purchase of certain fabric with a 65% rayon/ 35% wool content. Sumagh 
knowingly shipped fabric with 70% rayon and 30% wool content to 
Hyosung. In order to comply with the LC terms, Sumagh submitted 
documents which falsely indicated that the fabric had 65% rayon/35% wool 
content. Upon receipt of the documents, which on their face appeared to be 
valid, the Bank of Seoul paid Sumagh under the LC on which Hyosung was 
liable to reimburse the bank.45  
 In order for the court to decide whether Hyosung could stop the bank 
from making further payments on the LC and to recover the proceeds 
already paid, it looked at the elements of a common law fraud under the 
New York law, which included: 
a. a material false representation; 
                                                 
44 (1998) 25 F. Supp. 2d 376 (SDNY) (USA) as quoted in King Tak Fung's Leading Court Cases on Letters 
of Credit 
45 Note that the plaintiff is not the Bank of Seoul but Hyosung, which raised the issue whether Hyosung 
could successfully assert a fraud claim when Sumagh’s mirepresentation was made to the Bank of Seol. 
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b. intent to defraud; 
c. reasonable reliance on the representation; and  
d. causing damage to the plaintiff 
The court applied these elements to the fact of the case and concluded 
that Sumagh knew that the goods shipped did not match the description of 
the goods stated in the documents, Sumagh also knew that the Bank of Seoul 
would pay if the documents on their face were compliant. The court,  
therefore, concluded that Sumagh had intended to defraud Hyosung. It was 
also clear that if Sumagh had not falsified the documents, the Bank of Seoul 
wouldn’t have paid on the LC. The court held that Sumagh had made a 
material false representation on which the Bank of Seoul relied, resulting in 
payment on the LC. 
The court held: 
“…The harm to Hyosung was immediate and definite: by drawing on the 
letters of credit, Sumagh imposed on Hyosumg a new obligation to the 
Bank.”46 
“The doctrine of independent contracts seeks to ensure that the issuing 
bank will promptly pay on letters of credit. However, once the issuer has 
paid on the letter of credit, the independent contract doctrine’s purpose is 
satisfied; it cannot be invoked as a bar to recovery against a beneficiary who 
submitted false documents to draw down on the letter of credit…”47  
This case shows the common law fraud elements under the New York 
law and the key criteria a court may consider in granting an injunction 
stopping a bank from paying under an LC, and that the applicant may rely on 
                                                 
46 ibid 
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misrepresentations which were presented to the bank and not to the applicant 
personally. 
 
*The American Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
 The UCC provided one of the few examples of a codified system of 
law relating to documentary transactions. In most jurisdictions, the law 
relating to documentary credits arises through case law. The Sztejn v. Henry 
Schroder Banking Corporation48 was a very important turning point in the 
American law and it is thought that the American law on documentary credit 
fraud being codified in the UCC was a direct result of that case. 
 The UCP is generally applied by the courts because most international 
banks adopt these rules when dealing with documentary transactions. Unlike 
the UCP, the UCC has specific provisions concerning the exceptions to the 
independence principle, with particular reference to the fraud exception.  
 The UCC is an Act that harmonizes the laws of sale and other 
commercial transactions in 50 states within the United States of America. 
This is important because of the nature of commercial transactions that 
extend beyond one state. For example where goods are manufactured in state 
A, warehoused in state B, sold in state C, and delivered in state D.  
 The UCC allows a bank to avoid payment on a letter of credit, if the 
documents presented are fraudulent, or if there is fraud in the transaction49. It 
limits the doctrine of strict compliance, and gives the bank the opportunity to 
refuse payment under a letter of credit. It also answers the question of 
whether the fraud that gives rise to refusal of payment should be fraud in the 
                                                 
48 31 NYS 2d 631 (1941) 
49 Article 5-109 specifically provides that a bank can dishonor a letter of credit if payment would facilitate a 
material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant. In other words , the fraud need not be contained 
in the presented documentation. This means that even fraud in the underlying transaction could give the 
bank grounds for not paying. 
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underlying transaction or in the documents presented. It states that if the 
documents presented appear on their face to comply with the terms and 
conditions of the credit, but a certain document is forged, or if honouring the 
credit would facilitate fraud on the applicant or issuer by the beneficiary the 
bank may refuse to pay.  
If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly to comply 
with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit, but a required 
document is forged or materially fraudulent, or honouring the 
presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on 
the issuer or applicant: 
(1) the issuer shall honour the presentation, if honour is 
demanded by (i) a nominated person who has given value in good 
faith and without notice of forgery or material fraud, (ii) a 
confirmer who has honoured its confirmation in good faith, (iii) a 
holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter of credit 
which was taken after acceptance by the issuer or nominated 
person, or (iv) an assignee of the issuer's or nominated person's 
deferred obligation that was taken for value and without notice of 
forgery or material fraud after the obligation was incurred by the 
issuer or nominated person; and(2) the issuer, acting in good 
faith, may honour or dishonour the presentation in any other 
case.50 
 This answers the question of whether the fraud committed should be 
in the underlying contract or in the documents presented. The wording of the 
                                                 
50 Article 5-109 
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UCC clearly states that if the fraud is in the documents, then it is ground for 
the bank to refuse payment. In addition to that, it states that if the honouring 
of the credit would help commit a fraudulent act or assist in inflicting 
damage then the bank may also refuse to pay. This means that even if the 
documents are in order but there is fraud in the underlying contract then this 
still gives rise to the fraud exception. 
 
 26
The UCC and the UCP: 
  
If a conflict arises between the UCC and the UCP, especially when a 
letter of credit has been issued under the terms of the UCP , certain states 
legislatures have provided that article 5 of the UCC will be inapplicable. 
However, since the UCP does not deal with the Fraud exception, all issues 
relating to fraud in such states will still be dealt under the terms of the 
UCC.51 
  
 In conclusion, the approach in American Law has been a broad and 
more diverse one than in other jurisdictions. Although the UCC has limited 
the exceptions to the independence principle to fraud, it made it clear that 
the fraud exception extends to fraud in the underlying contract and not 
merely to fraud in the presented documents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Basil Coutsoudis Op cit p. 21 
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B TheEnglish Law Approach to The Fraud Exception: 
 
 
 Unlike the English courts, the American courts were more willing to 
recognize and apply the fraud exception.  The development in the English 
courts was much slower but more stable. In the matters of Hamzeh Malas 
&Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd52 and Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v 
Barclays Bank International Ltd53 the court expressed the evidence needed 
for the establishment of fraud. 
 In Hamzeh Malas &Sons v British Imex Industries Ltd54 the plaintiffs, 
a Jordanian firm, contracted to purchase from the defendants, a British firm, 
a large quantity of reinforced steel rods, to be delivered in two instalments. 
Payment was to be effected by the opening in favour of the defendants of 
two confirmed letters of credit with the Midland Bank Ltd in London, one in 
respect of each instalment. The letters of credit were duly opened and the 
first was realized by the defendants on the delivery of the first instalment. 
The plaintiffs complained that that instalment was defective and sought an 
injunction to bar the defendants from realizing the second letter of credit. 
Donovan J. refused the application. The plaintiffs appealed and it was held 
that although the court had a wide jurisdiction to grant injunctions, this was 
not a case in which, in exercise of its discretion, it ought to do so. An 
elaborate commercial system had been built upon the footing that a 
confirmed letter of credit constituted a bargain between the banker and the 
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vendor of the goods, which imposed upon the banker an absolute obligation 
to pay, irrespective of any dispute there might be between the parties as to 
whether or not, the goods were up to contract. In the words of  Jenkins L.J. 
“The court’s jurisdiction to grant injunctions is wide, but in my judgment, 
this is not a case in which the court ought to grant one”. In an obiter 
statement, Sellers LJ, suggested that the court may under certain 
circumstances grant the injunction sought, such as in the case of a fraudulent 
transaction. 
 In Edward Owen Engineering Ltd v Barclays Bank International 
Ltd55, the court cited the Sztejn56case and held that the only case where it 
could interfere with the bank’s obligation to pay would be in the case of 
obvious fraud, to the knowledge of the bank. Both of these case fell short of 
establishing fraud according to the bank’s requirements, clear evidence of 
fraud and the knowledge of the paying bank. 
 Both of the above cases are related to performance guarantees and not 
letters of credit. The difference between the two is that performance 
guarantees secure compensation for non performance while letters of credit 
secure payment for performance. Since the principles relating to letters of 
credit apply to performance guarantees, the principles of these cases apply 
equally to the letters of credit. 
 Thirty Five Years after the fraud exception had been applied in the 
American courts, the English courts in the late 1970’s bended the 
independence principle by applying the fraud exception and establishing 
clear principle relating to it. 
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The first reported case where the scope and nature of the fraud 
exception was examined in detail is the case of Discount Records Ltd. V. 
Barclays Bank Ltd and another57. The facts of this case are similar to the 
facts of the American Sztejn case58. In this case the plaintiff applied for an 
injunction against the bank, on the basis that the seller had acted 
fraudulently, in knowingly shipping worthless goods to the buyer, in order to 
obtain shipping documents, to obtain payment on the letter of credit. The 
court was reluctant to issue an injunction against the bank, in the basis that 
the plaintiff was not affected by such a payment since it was made with the 
bank’s funds. The plaintiff could later simply refuse to reimburse the bank, 
if the bank had indeed acted wrongly in making payment to the seller.59  
This puts the bank in a difficult position, as it runs the risk of not being 
reimbursed by the buyer if it made payment notwithstanding the existence of 
adequate justification not to pay on the basis of the fraud exception. On the 
other hand, the bank may risk being sued if it refuses to pay the beneficiary 
without adequate justification. 
 Due to the similarities between this case and the Sztejn v Henry 
Schrouder Banking Corporation60 it should be noted here the difference 
between the approach of the American courts and the English courts. In the 
Sztejn case the court held that shipping of worthless goods was ground for 
granting an injunction. On the other hand, the English courts recognized the 
existence of an exception based on fraud, but it limited its application to a 
defence that is available only to the party that is defending a claim to make 
payment under a letter of credit. The issue of the applicant obtaining an 
                                                 
57 (1975)1 All ER 1071 
58 Sztejn v. J Henry Shrouder Banking Corporation  op cit p.21 
59 It is said that a court should not grant an injunction, unless it is an absolute final remedy, and unless the 
applicant has absolutely no other recourse in law. 
60 ibid 21 
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injunction to prevent the bank from paying has never been questioned 
subsequent to the Discunt Records matter. It is said that if this case was 
presented to the court several years later, the court would have applied the 
fraud exception on the facts of the matter, and would most probably have 
granted the injunction.61 
 
*United City Merchants (Investment )Ltd and Glass Fibres and 
Equipment Ltd  v. Royal Bank of Canada62 
 This is perhaps the most referred to case in the English law as regards 
letters of credit. It is a landmark case concerning two of the most important 
exceptions to the principle of autonomy, the fraud exception and the 
illegality exception. The illegality shall be discussed later in this thesis. Prior 
to this case all of the cases involving the fraud exception, the beneficiary 
was a party to the fraud. 
The summary of the facts concerning fraud is that Glass Fibres 
entered into contractual relations with a Vitrorefuerzos to manufacture 
equipment necessary for Vitrorefuerzos to be able to make fibreglass in 
Peru. Vitro instructed its bank to open a letter of credit in favour of Glass 
Fibres, and this was done through the defendants, the Royal Bank of Canada. 
On 30 of March 1976, Royal Bank of Canada notified Glass Fibres that it 
had confirmed an irrevocable L/C issued in its favour by Banco Continental 
SA. Payment was to be made on the f.o.b value of the equipment plus 100%, 
against a full set of clean on board ocean bills of lading drawn to the order of 
Banco. Glass Fibres thereafter assigned to the first plaintiffs (United City 
Merchants) their rights, entitlements and benefits due under the letter of 
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credit, and notice of the assignment was given to the defendants. Some time 
later, the defendants wrote to Glass Fibres, stating that in accordance with 
instructions received the credit was thereby amended. Neither of the 
plaintiffs confirmed their agreement to the amendment. 
 The terms of the L/C required “on board” bills of lading evidencing 
shipment of goods from London on or before 15 December 1976. Glass 
Fibres forwarded the various pieces of equipment to M.C.K. Freight Ltd, 
with explicit instructions confirming the terms of the letters of credit, and in 
particular pointing out that shipment was to take place on or before the 15th 
of October 1976. The containers arrived in Felixstowe on the 9th of 
December, and were loaded on the American Accord on the 16th of 
December. This was obviously contrary to the provisions of the letters of 
credit, and would thus have allowed the defendant bank under normal 
circumstances to refuse to make payment under the letters of credit63.   
Upon presentation the defendants refused the documents because they 
had information in their possession suggesting that the goods were shipped 
from Felixstowe on the 16th, not on the15th from London as it appeared on 
the bills of lading. They also said that the plaintiffs knew of the 
discrepancies before presenting the documents. It was also alleged that Mr. 
Baker, an official of the freight agents, acted as an agent on the plaintiff’s 
behalf in making out the bills of lading as he did, with full knowledge that 
the statement was incorrect and that if the correct statement was reflected on 
the bills, that the bank would have refused payment. The counsel acting for 
the bank also argued that, alternatively, the bank was still entitled to refuse 
payment as the beneficiary’s knowledge was immaterial to the fraud 
exception. 
                                                 
63 Such refusal would be in accordance with the principle of strict compliance. 
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Counsel for the seller tried to reply to each argument. Thus,while 
accepting the existence of the fraud exception, they argued that the bank was 
not entitled to use it, due to the fact that the exception requires fraud which 
occurred with the knowledge of the beneficiary, or the person who presented 
the documents to the paying bank. 
Before discussing the House of Lords judgment, the decisions of the 
High Court and the Court of Appeal will first be discussed. 
 
Queen’s Bench Decision:- 
The court held that Mr Baker knew that he was making a false 
presentation on the bills of lading, upon which the bank was going to pay. 
The plaintiffs were not aware of his fraudulent behaviour. 
Mocatta J. rejected the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff had failed 
to abide by the terms of the amendments, on the basis that the UCP 
specifically requires the beneficiary’s consent prior to an amendment of the 
terms of letter of credit. The fact that the plaintiffs had been notified of the 
proposed amendment and the fact that they failed to respond could not be 
construed as an acceptance of the amendment.  
    Mocatta J found that Mr. Baker was indeed guilty of committing 
fraud by presenting documents that falsely presented the date of shipment. 
However Mocatta J could not find that the freight agents were working as 
agents for the plaintiff, they were in fact acting as loading brokers for 
Prudential Lines. By proving this, there was no evidence whatsoever to 
establish fraud on the part of the plaintiffs. 
Having dealt with those issues, it was time to deal with the most 
important one, the issue of strict compliance. In his opinion, the second set 
of bills of lading which were produced appeared to be in compliance with 
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the terms of the credit. Thus the bank was compelled to make payment on 
the documents. He referred to previous cases including Hamzeh Malass v 
British Imex64and Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. V Barclay’s Bank 
International65. He quoted Jenkins LJ in the former case, who stated “ It 
seems to be plain enough that the opening of the confirmed letter of credit 
constitutes a bargain between the banker and the vendor of the goods, which 
imposes on the banker an absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any 
dispute between the parties as to whether the goods are up to contract or not. 
An elaborate commercial system has been built up on the footing that a 
bankers’ confirmed credit is of that character, and, in my judgment, it would 
be wrong for the Court in the present case66 to interfere with that established 
practice.” 
In addition to those cases, he also referred to the American Sztejn 
case67 where it was held that “It must be assumed that the seller has 
intentionally failed to ship the goods ordered by the buyer. In such a 
situation, where the bank got to know of the seller’s fraud before the drafts 
and documents have been presented for payment, the principle of the 
independence of the bank’s obligation under the letter of credit should not be 
extended to protect the unscrupulous seller.” 
Mocatta J appeared as if he established the fraud exception as s 
defence by stating that “…seems to be nothing in the authorities to prevent a 
confirming bank from raising the issue of fraud as a defence after having 
refused to pay on the presentation of the documents…”. It should be noted 
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that the traditional application of fraud was focused on obtaining injunctions 
preventing the bank from paying under a letter of credit.  
According to all of the above, Mocatta J held that, in spite of the fact 
that, fraud was sufficiently established on its face, it was not within the 
knowledge of the beneficiary, and for this reason, allowed the plaintiff’s 
claim against the defendant bank, as far as it related to the fraud exception.  
The importance of Mocatta J view of inaccuracy arises from the fact 
that all the previous cases dealt with fraud on part of the beneficiary, but the 
vital aspect of this decision is not so much whether the fraud exception can 
be extended to incorporate material inaccuracy, but rather, whether it was 
limited to instances where the beneficiary had knowledge of the fraud on 
presentation of the documents. 
 
*Court of Appeal Decision:- 
The judgment was given by Stephenson L.J., who initially went 
through the same set of facts relating to the matter. Stephenson L.J. like 
Mocatta J, dealt with the illegality and with the fraud exception separately. 
As mentioned earlier the illegality shall be discussed later.  
When dealing with the issue of fraud, he specifically dealt with the 
question of whether the fraud exception could be applied in cases where the 
beneficiary was unaware of such fraud. Stephenson L.J. made a distinction 
between an inaccurate document and a false one. A document that tells a lie 
about the maker or about the time or place of making is a forged document. 
On the other hand, a document which lies about its contents would be 
considered as a fraudulent document. The court recognized the distinction, 
but it held that it need not take it further. 
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Stephenson L.J. addressed these issues by saying, “the exception of 
fraud does not apply when the fraud is not the fraud of the seller or 
beneficiary who tenders the documents. In my judgment it does, and I 
therefore express no opinion on the effect of material inaccuracy honestly 
included in the document presented to the bank…”Accordingly, Stephenson 
reversed Mocatta’s decision, and ruled that it is immaterial to the exception 
whether the fraud is that of the beneficiary, or of a third party. It is also 
immaterial as to whether the beneficiary knew of the fraud committed by 
such third party. 
In his decision Stephenson L.J. also referred to the Sztejn68 case where 
it was stated that, “The bank ought not to pay under the credit if it knows 
that the documents are forged or that the request for payment is made 
fraudulently in circumstances where there is no right to payment”. In Bank 
Russo-Iran v Gordon Woodroffe & Co Ltd69, it was stated that, “The 
exception is that where the documents under the credit are presented by the 
beneficiary himself, and the bank knows when the documents presented that 
they are forged or fraudulent, the bank is entitled to refuse payment.” 
Stephenson L.J. points out that these cases dealt with fraud on the part 
of the beneficiary, but in his opinion this does not support the plaintiff’s 
assertion that the fraud exception is not applicable where the fraud was 
committed by a third party and the beneficiary was unaware of it. His point 
of view is quite practical, he thought of who should bear the loss. In his 
opinion, the bank and applicant are both innocent parties. On the other hand, 
even if the beneficiary is innocent and did not commit the fraud, he is under 
the duty to present conforming documents, and if by choosing a third party 
                                                 
68Op cit p.21 
69 Unreported (1972) 
 36
who did not fulfil his obligations under the credit, then he should be deemed 
responsible and face the risk of loss.70 
The requirements of fraud in Stephenson L.J. judgement are: 
(a) a fraudulent misrepresentation must be contained in the document 
(b) the fraud must be clearly established 
(c) the bank must have knowledge of the fraud 
 
By this, Mocatta’s decision was overruled, and the Court ruled in 
favour of the bank.  
The matter was then referred to the House of Lords. 
 
House of Lords Decision:-     
The House of Lords confirmed the findings of the previous courts, in 
particular those relating to Mr Baker’s fraud. The House of Lords was 
required to determine if the previous courts applied the law correctly to the 
facts, and in particular whether the fraud exception could be enforced if the 
beneficiary presenting the documents was unaware of the fraud. The court 
confirmed the independence principle by stating that it was given that the 
contract between the beneficiary and the paying bank is based on the 
conformity of the documents and not goods. 
 Lord Diplock stated:  
 
“If, on their face, the documents presented to the confirming bank by 
the seller conform with the requirements of the credit as notified to him by 
the confirming bank, the bank is under a contractual obligation to the seller 
                                                 
70 It should be noted here that shipping the goods one day late would not have been material in a normal 
sale of goods contract and the buyer would not have been legally entitled to avoid his obligations, but since 
this case was concerned with payment under a letter of credit then the doctrine of strict compliance 
governed the matter. 
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to honour the credit, notwithstanding, the fact that the bank has knowledge 
that the seller at the time of presentation of the conforming documents is 
alleged by the buyer to have, and in fact has already, committed a breach of 
his contract with the buyer for the sale of the goods to which the documents 
appear on their face to relate, that would have entitled the buyer to treat the 
contract of sale as rescinded, reject the goods and refuse to pay the seller the 
purchase price. ” 
 
Lord Diplock clearly supports the application of the independence 
principle in English Law,71 and that there is only one exception to it, fraud. 
Lord Diplock referred to the fraud exception as one that has as yet not 
been applied in any English case law. He considered that the fraud exception 
was well established in American law, and confirmed that it was based on 
the ex turpi causa rule. In Sztejn v J. Schroder Banking Corporation72, the 
nature of the exception required that the beneficiary must have acted 
fraudulently. That meant that the beneficiary should not benefit from his 
own fraud.  
It was held that the case at hand did not fall under the fraud exception 
because the sellers were not aware of Mr. Baker’s fraud. The court also 
rejected the defendants argument that the confirming bank is under no 
obligation to make payment under the documentary credit if the documents 
presented contained an inaccurate material fact, even if the documents on 
their face were conforming on their face to the terms of the credit. The court 
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rejected this argument on the basis that it would undermine the whole 
system of financial international trade by means of documentary credits. 
The court did not go into the fraud exception beyond the ex turpi 
causa rule, and decided that the fraud exception was limited to the cases 
where the beneficiary had knowledge, and that a third-party fraud, of which 
the beneficiary was not aware of when presenting the documents, is not 
sufficient. 
 Lord Diplock also referred to Article 9 of the UCP, where it stated 
that issuing or confirming banks assume no liability to the buyer, for the 
form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification, or legal effect of any 
documents. He stated that this duty of the bank towards the applicant must 
correspond with its duty towards the beneficiary. On this basis, he rejected 
the defendants’ claim that the bank need not pay if the documents contained 
any material statement that was inaccurate. 
Lord Goode pointed out that Article 9 of the UCP does not create a 
duty to the bank, but rather creates an entitlement in favour of the bank 
enabling it to make payment to the beneficiary on documents, which on their 
face appear to conform to the requirements of the credit, without fear of 
recourse from the applicant in the event of the documents later being false.73 
The House of Lords placed a lot of emphasis on the fact that when 
Baker committed the fraud, the documents were so designed as to deceive 
the plaintiff just as much as it was designed to deceive the other party. One 
might agree with the decision of the Court of Appeal on the basis that the 
buyer is an innocent party and should be protected from such fraud. In 
addition to that, it may be argued that it is the seller’s duty to present 
                                                 
73 On the other hand this gives the bank the choice not to pay.  
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conforming documents to the paying bank, and it is his duty to make sure 
that all the documents are compliant.  
It is apparent that American courts are much more willing and open 
minded when it comes to the application of the fraud exception. The English 
courts should look beyond the ex turpi causa rule and apply the exception 
even in cases where the beneficiary was unaware of the fraudulent 
statement.  
In the above case, let us assume that the goods in question were some 
type of medicine and the delay in shipping affected them. Would the 
bank still be obliged to pay, even if it had information that the goods 
were in fact defective, merely on the fact that the beneficiary was not 
aware of the inaccuracy? The decision of the House of Lords states 
that it should pay. 
 
The Narrow and The Wide Approach to the Fraud Exception: 
 
From all that has been discussed, it seems that there are two 
approaches to the application of the fraud exception. The first is the narrow 
approach which narrows the application of the fraud exception to fraud that 
relates to documents. On the other hand, the wider approach applies the 
exception even if the fraud exists in the underlying transaction.74 
  
 
The Position after United City Merchants: 
Subsequent case law helped to develop some aspects of the law that 
were not dealt with in United City Merchants.  
                                                 
74 In the Edward Owen case it is apparent that Lord Denning leaned towards the wider approach 
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Clear requirements as to the onus of proof required from the party 
who seeks to avoid payment under the letter of credit were established. If a 
plaintiff applied for an injunction to stop the bank from paying under the 
credit, then he must show that the payment is likely to permit the beneficiary 
to profit from his own fraud at the expense of the plaintiff.75 In order for an 
injunction to be granted then the plaintiff has to convince the court by 
presenting a clear and sufficient case of fraud. The mere allegation of fraud 
is not sufficient.76 Clear strong evidence is required, normally in the form of 
documentation, is required by the court. The court must decide, solely on the 
documents in front of it, whether the only realistic conclusion to draw is that 
fraud has been committed. 
When viewing the standard of proof as stated in United Trading 
Corporation, Waller J in the case of Turkiye Is Bankasi AS v Bank of 
China77 stated: 
“It is not for the bank to make enquiries about the allegations that are 
being made by one side against the other… (the applicant) must put the 
irrefutable evidence in front of the bank.” 
He stressed that the bank should not be expected to investigate 
whether the allegations of fraud are true or not. The evidence placed in front 
of it should clearly make it apparent that fraud has been committed.   
In the case of Deutsche Ruckversichering AG v Wallbrook Insurance 
co Ltd and others78 the plaintiffs tried to convince the court that the onus of 
proof differed, whether that plaintiff was applying for an injunction against 
                                                 
75 Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank, Commercial Bank of Syria and General Company of Homs 
Refinery (1984) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 251 as quoted byBasil Coutsoudis op cit31 
76 United Trading Corporation SA and Murray Clayton Ltd v Allied Arab Bank Ltd and others (1985) 2 
Lloyds’s Rep 554 as quoted by Basil Coutsoudis op cit30 
77 (1996) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 611 
78 (1994) 4 ALL ER 181 
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the beneficiary directly, or against the bank preventing it from making 
payment to the beneficiary under the letter of credit. The court rejected this 
argument on the basis that it would interfere with the independence principle 
and the beneficiary’s rights. 
In United City Merchants79 the fraud dealt with was present in 
documents; the court did not deal with fraud in the underlying transaction, 
since it was not relevant. In Themehelp Ltd v West and others80 the 
arguments discusse whether the fraud must be present in the documentary 
credit transaction or whether it is sufficient that fraud is present in the 
underlying transaction. In this case the plaintiff alleged that the beneficiary 
had fraudulently misrepresented facts during the negotiation of the contract 
of sale, in averring to have the support of a client that had in fact transferred 
its business to a competitor. The contract was to the knowledge of both 
parties concluded on the basis of this representation. This misrepresentation 
was not a condition on the bank guarantee, and thus the fraud committed 
was not present in the documents, but merely in the underlying transaction.81 
Waite L.J. upheld the fraud exception as stated in United City 
Merchants82, and the onus of proof as stated in Bolivinter Oil SA, and United 
Trading Corporation SA83. He was of the opinion that the plaintiff satisfied 
the onus of proof, and was thus entitled for an injunction. 
The court decided that the fraud exception did in fact apply. It is 
suggested that was not merely an oversight on the part of the court, because 
Evans LJ, in his dissenting judgment, specifically took this distinction into 
                                                 
79 Op cit p. 31 
80 (1995) 3 WLR 751 
81 As quoted by Basil Coutsoudis op cit p 54  
82 Op cit p. 31 
83 Op cit p. 39 
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account and stated his opinion that the intended drawing on the letter of 
credit or guarantee itself must be fraudulent.  
This judgment doesn’t mean that the decision of the House of Lords in 
United City Merchants and other cases applies to cases where fraud is only 
apparent in the underlying transaction. It does, however, suggest that when 
such a case of fraud appears it is in the hands of the court to determine 
whether the fraud exception applies or not, and to interpret the decision of 
the House of Lords.  
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Comparison between the American and the English Approach to the 
Fraud Exception: 
 
The three fundamental elements concerning fraud are: 
1 the fraud should be clear, 
2 the bank should have knowledge of the fraud,  
3 the beneficiary’s knowledge of the fraud committed. 
 The approach of either the American or English courts differs towards 
these elements and their importance. 
 In the American case of Sztejn v. Henry Schroder Banking 
Corporation84, which is considered the most important case concerning the 
American courts’ approach to the fraud exception, the court decided that 
fraud is considered fundamental enough for the bank to refuse payment if in 
accordance to the doctrine of strict compliance the bank would have been 
entitled to refuse payment if the true position was revealed. This clearly 
covers the first two elements mentioned earlier. That is to say that if the 
fraud was clearly established and the bank had clear knowledge of it the 
bank would be entitled to refuse payment. In addition to that, the UCC 
allows the bank to refuse payment even if the fraud is in the underlying 
contract85, which means that the fraud need not necessarily be established in 
the document presented. 
 The American courts’ approach to fraud simply means that if fraud is 
committed, either in the documents presented or in the underlying contract, 
and the bank has clear knowledge of that fraud, which entitles the bank to 
refuse payment. This is quite a wide approach of the fraud exception. 
                                                 
84 supra p.21 
85 Article 5-109 
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 On the other hand, the English courts were very cautious when 
applying the fraud exception and specially when issuing injunctions. The 
English courts in the majority of the cases held that the bank’s can be 
ordered to stop payment in cases of obvious fraud, to the knowledge of the 
bank.86 
 These two points are just the same as in the American approach. But 
perhaps the most fundamental difference is the one of the beneficiary’s 
knowledge or involvement in the fraudulent act itself. It has been held in 
United City Merchants (Investment) Ltd and Glass Fibres and Equipment 
Ltd v. Royal Bank of Canada that if the documents presented by the seller 
conform with the requirement of the credit then the bank is under a 
contractual obligation to the seller to honour the credit notwithstanding the 
fact that the bank at the time of presentation has knowledge that the seller 
has allegedly committed a breach of his contract with the buyer.87 That 
means that if the fraud is committed in the underlying contract and the 
presented documents are conforming then the independence principle 
applies and the bank is under a duty to pay. 
 Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the American and 
English approach in addition to the one concerning the fraud contained in 
the underlying contract, is the one concerning the beneficiary’s knowledge. 
The court held in the United City Merchants case that if the beneficiary did 
not commit the fraud himself or even if he was not aware of the fraud 
committed by a third party then this does not give rise to the fraud exception. 
                                                 
86 Hamzeh Malas & Sons v. British Inex Industries Ltd. , and Edwrd Owen Engineering Ltd V. Barclay’s  
Bank  International Ltd. 
87 The courts stand by the independence principle 
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 *In English courts, fraud affects payment when:  
1 the beneficiary himself has committed the fraud  
2 the beneficiary is aware of the fact that the documents presented, although 
seem genuine, contain some facts which are untrue. 
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*The Fraud Exception in Other Jurisdictions 
 
  
South Africa:- 
 
Loomcraft Fabrics CC v Nedbank Ltd88  
 
In this case, the applicant sought to restrain Nedbank from making 
payment on the letter of credit, based on the allegation that the beneficiary 
had fraudulently misrepresented the date of shipment on the shipping 
documents.  
This case was the first time where the Appellate Division of the South 
African High Court dealt with the fraud exception. The court referred to all 
the classic English cases relating to the principle of independence, including 
Edward Owen Engineering, Bolivinter Oil, and others. By doing this the 
court showed its intention of using the English case law as a guide to the 
development of the law in South Africa.89  
Scott AJA lowered the standard regarding the onus of proof by stating 
that the onus is discharged on the ordinary civil onus, that is, on a balance of 
probabilities. This is clearly lower than the one required in English law, as 
stated in Tukan Timber Ltd v Barclays Bank90, where the fraud must be 
clearly established. Scott AJA stated “fraud will not lightly be inferred 
particularly when, I should add, it is brought in motion proceeding”.91 
                                                 
88 South Africa, 1996 (1) SA 812(A) 
89 The facts of this case are very similar to those of the United City Merchants since both deal with 
fraudulent shipping dates. It is likely that the court was guided by the fraud exception as stated by Lord 
Diplock. 
90 (1987) QB 175 
91 However, in the case of ZZ Enterprises (1995) CLD 769 (W) the onus of proof was formulated according 
to the English case law, and the court held that the fraud must be clearly established before the fraud 
exception can be invoked.  
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In addition to that, Scott AJA limited the fraud exception to cases 
where the appellant had to prove that the beneficiary presented to the bank 
documents that contained material misrepresentation that, to his knowledge, 
was untrue, and he knew that the bank would rely on those documents when 
paying him on the letter of credit. This shows that the South African courts 
adopted the narrow approach to the fraud exception rather than the wider 
one, which means that in South Africa the exception exists only with fraud 
in the documents and not when the fraud exists in the underlying transaction. 
While ruling on this case Scott AJA was unclear as to the use of the 
term material representation, he either referred to the standard required in 
terms of the law of contract, or as it was adopted in the decision of the 
House of Lord in United City Merchants, were if the bank was aware of the 
true position would be justified for non-payment. 
In the South African law, a party may not as a general rule apply for 
an injunction if there is an alternative option. In the case at hand the buyer 
would have had the option to refuse to reimburse the bank and to defend any 
claims for payment made by the bank, if the bank had indeed wrongly paid 
under the credit. 
In his judgment Scott AJA stated that when conforming documents 
are presented to the bank, “the bank will escape liability only on proof of 
fraud on the part of the beneficiary.” From his statement, it seems that 
according to him, the only possible exception is that of fraud by the 
beneficiary, where he knowingly presents documents that contain a material 
misrepresentation. 
In his judgment, Scott AJA also recognized the national view that an 
injunction is possible but only under the most extreme and exceptional 
circumstances. It is limited to cases of clear and established fraud. The 
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requirements of clear and established fraud did not exist and mostly for that 
reason the application for an injunction failed.  
It is clear that even though the courts have very wide and large powers 
for giving an injunction, they are reluctant to do so, whether it is the English 
courts or the South African ones. I am not aware of a case where an 
application by the buyer for an injunction has actually been approved by the 
court. The buyer has the option not to reimburse the bank if it wrongly paid 
under the letter of credit, or he can sue the seller under the contract of sale.  
According to Scott AJA statement “the bank will escape liability only 
on proof of fraud on the part of the beneficiary” it seems that the only 
exception in the South African law is of fraud; when the beneficiary 
knowingly presents documents that contain a fraudulent misrepresentation.92 
 
Hong Kong:- 
 
A recent case in Hong Kong provides an excellent illustration of the 
application of fraud. The court stated that the fraud must be clear and 
obvious. 
 
UniCredito Italiano SpA v Alan Chung Wah Tang (2002)93 
 
The facts of the case are that Guang Xin applied to UniCredito for two 
local L/Cs of US $2.78 million and US$ 1.09 million, respectively. 
UniCredito issued the two L/Cs in accordance with the application, except 
that the beneficiary’s drafts were not included on the list of required 
                                                 
92 As it is going to be discussed later the House of Lords in England recognized another exception, that of 
illegality. 
93 King Tak Fung's Leading Court Cases on Letters of Credit 
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documents. On the same day that each of the L/Cs was issued, Guang Xin 
signed a trust receipt in favour of the bank. Upon the receipt of compliant 
documents, UniCredito effected payment under the L/Cs and booked two 
trust receipt loans due on 19 November and 2 December 1998, respectively. 
On 12 October 1998, Guang Xin  went into liquidation. No actual goods 
pertaining to the L/Cs were found. The bank’s submission of proof of debt 
for the sums due under the L/C were rejected by the liquidators of Guang 
Xin on the grounds that UniCredito has been “reckless” and “turned a blind 
eye” in issuing the L/Cs and in making payments under the L/Cs. UniCredito 
sought a court order to overturn the liquidator’s rejection of UniCredito’s 
claims under the L/Cs.  
The counsel for the liquidator said that in the absence of “positive 
knowledge” of fraud by the bank, a lesser standard of “recklessness” against 
the bank should be tested. The judge held that: 
“it is well-established law that the test is whether, standing in the 
shoes of the paying bank at the time of payment, the fraud was clear and 
obvious to it…If fraud was clear and obvious, then the bank pays the 
beneficiary at its own  peril and it is not entitled to reimbursement. But if 
fraud is not clear and obvious, then it is not for a banker to question why the 
businessmen involved in the underlying transaction had chosen to conduct 
their business in any particular way.” 
The judge further stated: 
“It is clear that fraud must only be alleged when there is sufficient 
evidence and then it must be alleged specifically with full particulars. It is 
established principle that it is not fair and just to permit a party to raise a 
vague unparticularised case in the hope of making it good after 
discovery…Although one understands the constraints placed upon 
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liquidators and their duty to examine all claims with care, that principle 
nevertheless applies to them. They cannot put forward an amorphous case of 
fraud unsupported by proper particulars, prompting a denial by the other 
party and then assert that a proper issue of fraud has been joined between the 
parties.” 
It was then held that no issue of fraud has been properly and validly 
raised by the liquidators in the present case. In one of the liquidators 
arguments, it was argued that the bank’s “recklessness” was shown by it 
having “turned a blind eye to the [following] points of suspicion”. 
“[I]n relation to the applications for the letters of credit, that the letters 
of credit applied for were for a substantial sum, that the beneficiaries’ offices 
were located near the Company, that no Advising Bank was involved, and 
that the documents required were few and simple…” 
The judge said: 
“in relation to the points made on the applications for the letters of 
credit, none of the matters referred to, whether singly or jointly, could give 
clear and obvious notice of fraud. The company was a subsidiary of GITIC, 
a financial institution wholly owned by the Guangdong Provincial 
Government that engaged in a wide variety of business activities. The letters 
of credit in question were for amounts which were within approved or 
authorized limits for the Company. Since these were purportedly for goods 
sold and delivered locally, the absence of requirements for shipping 
documents, air way bills, insurance documents and other paraphernalia of 
international trade would not have been surprising. Similarly, the absence of 
an advising bank would not have been surprising. As for the fact that the 
offices of the beneficiaries were within a few hundred meters (in case of 
one) and a few kilometres (in case of the other) of the Company, I fail to see 
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how that could have caused a banker to have notice that fraud was clear and 
obvious.” 
This case clearly shows the elements needed in order for fraud to be 
applied as an exception. In addition to that, the case shows how the courts 
are protective of the letters of credit as an international mechanism and will 
not accept weak allegations of fraud in L/Cs. 
 
This other case in Hong Kong concerns the standard of proof needed 
for a court in order to restrain a bank from making payment and the 
beneficiary from dealing with the L/C: 
 
Prime Deal (HK) Enterprises v HSBC and another (2002)94 
 
In this case, at the request of Prime Deal, on 24 May 2001 and 4 April 
2002, HSBC issued two standby L/Cs for 250,000 pounds and 100,000 
pounds respectively in favour of Teddy SpA. On 28 May 2002, Teddy SpA 
drew both standby L/Cs for a total of 350,000 pounds. Prime Deal attempted 
to contact Teddy SpA by both telephone and e-mail but received no 
response. Prime Deal contended that Teddy had been perpetrating a fraud. 
On an ex parte application of Prime Deal, it obtained an interlocutory 
injunction restraining HSBC from paying out under the L/C; and restraining 
Teddy from obtaining payment under the two standby L/Cs. Teddy then 
applied to discharge the injunctions and the Hong Kong court had to decide 
whether to extend or discharge such injunctions. 
                                                 
94 ibid 
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 A beneficiary can apply to the court for one of two injunctions, either 
and injunction to restrain the bank from paying under an L/C, or an 
injunction to restrain the beneficiary from dealing with the L/C. 
A Injunctions to restrain payment under an L/C: 
 
As stated earlier, courts are very protective about L/Cs, they try to 
preserve the characteristics of L/Cs in their independence from the 
underlying contract. The judge in the present case quoted Lord Donaldson’s 
words in the Bolivinter Oil95 case: 
“…by obtaining an injunction restraining the bank from honouring 
that undertaking, he the (the applicant) will undermine what is the 
bank’s greatest asset, however large and rich it may be, namely its 
reputation for financial and contractual probity. Furthermore, if this 
happens at all frequently, the value of all irrevocable letters of credit 
and performance bonds and guarantees will be undermined.” 
The judge summarized the key principles that a court looks at when 
granting an injunction: 
 
“…in order to satisfy the court that an interlocutory injunction should 
be granted to restrain payment, the applicant must show by clear and 
cogent evidence both the fact of the fraud and the banks’ knowledge 
of it. Clear and cogent evidence means that a mere assertion will 
certainly not be enough: there must be strong or compelling 
corroborative evidence and the usual form of this would be 
contemporaneous documents. Where feasible, the court will expect 
alleged fraudulent party (the beneficiary under the letter of credit in 
                                                 
95 Bolivinter Oil SA v Chase Manhattan Bank (CA) (1984) 1 WLR 
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the question) to have been given an opportunity to answer allegations 
relating to the fraud before an application for an interlocutory 
injunction is made. Sometimes this is not feasible, but often it will be. 
The failure to give any or any proper explanation in answer to the 
queries raised when an answer can be expected will support the 
applicant’s case. ” 
 
The judge also quoted the following principle from the United 
Trading Corporation96 case: 
 
“If the Court considers that on the material before it the only realistic 
inference to draw is that of fraud, then the seller would have made out 
a sufficient case of fraud.” 
 
The judge then explained what was needed in order for an “only 
realistic inference” to be drawn. He stated that compelling and clear 
evidence is required. This involves both the serious question to be tried and 
the balance of convenience requirements. 
The serious question to be tried is a result of the principle that states 
that the more serious the allegation, the more compelling the evidence must 
be. 
As to the balance of convenience, in addition to the proof of fraud, the 
court will have to examine other factors to see whether the balance of 
convenience is or is not in favour of stopping payment. In the United 
Trading Corporation case stated above the court not only looked at the 
position of the applicant or beneficiary, but also to the position of the bank. 
                                                 
96 United Trading Corporation SA v Allied Arab Bank Limited (1985) 2 Lloyd’s  Rep. 554 
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It did so because if it were to issue an injunction it would seriously affect the 
reputation and integrity of the bank, which is vital in its business. 
In addition to that, even if the applicant could in fact prove fraud, and 
damages were an available remedy for him, then the courts will refuse to 
issue an injunction.97 
In this case, the court discharged the injunction on the basis that the 
injunction applications revealed some disputes between the parties, so the 
judge decided that based on the evidence before him, the only realistic 
inference to draw was that fraud had not been involved. 
The judge then noted that even if fraud has been established then he 
would not have granted the injunction, based on the fact that the plaintiff did 
not show that damages would not be available as a remedy. Both HSBC a 
well known bank and Teddy, a substantial Italian company, if at some later 
point were in fact held liable; then Prime Deal could recover its damage 
from the responsible party or parties. 
B Injunctions restraining the beneficiary from dealing with the L/C 
proceeds: 
This option is considered when courts do not grant an interlocutory 
injunction for whatever reason. Such an injunction will only be granted if 
there is a risk that the beneficiary will dissipate the proceeds and thereby 
thwart any judgment that the plaintiff may obtain against him. The issues to 
consider when issuing such an injunction are similar to those of a Mareva 
injunction98, in which case fraud does not have to be shown or proven, all 
that is required is a good arguable case, usually a breach of contract (or any 
cause of action for that matter, a risk of dissipation and the balance of 
                                                 
97 This is quite similar to the position in the South African law supra p.20 
98 Where the person will not be allowed to deal in the proceeds before the judgment. 
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convenience. If these requirements are applied to the case at hand then we 
find that both HSBC and Teddy are well-know companies and thus the risk 
of dissipation of assets was minimal. Accordingly, the court did not grant the 
injunction to restrain the beneficiary from dealing with the L/C proceeds. 
 
France:- 
 
Credit Lyonnais v. Canara Bank International Division99 
  
In this case, the Court of Cassation (the Supreme Court of France) 
was faced with the question: if a bank has confirmed a documentary credit 
available by acceptance, and accepted and discounted the draft drawn on it, 
is it entitled to reimbursement if fraud is established before maturity? 
The facts of the case are as follows, upon the request of Hamco, an 
aluminium importer based in India, Canara Bank, on 18 of March 1998, 
issued a documentary credit available by acceptance and stated to be payable 
180 days after the bill of lading date. Credit Lyonnais confirmed the credit. 
On 30 of March 1998, the French beneficiary, Soficom, presented the 
required documents. On 1 April 1998, the beneficiary discounted the yet to 
be accepted drafts with BDEI, a subsidiary of Credit Lyonnais. On 9 of April 
1998, Credit Lyonnais acknowledged the conformity of the documents, 
accepted the drafts drawn on it, undertook to pay them at maturity (15 
September 1998) and transmitted the documents to the issuing bank. 
At maturity, BDEI presented the accepted drafts to Credit Lyonnais 
for payment, but Credit Lyonnais refused to pay. It first contended that it had 
not yet received payment from the issuing bank, then indicated that it had 
                                                 
99 From the ICC Newsletter Documentary Credits Insight  by Georges Affaki 
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earlier agreed to an extension of the due date to 15 March 1999. Finally, on 
24 of September 1998, it rejected payment outright on account of fraud. 
Later, Credit Lyonnais went through a number of corporate 
reorganization changes, the result of which was that BDEI transferred its 
receivables portfolio, including its payment claim under the documentary 
credit in hand to Credit Lyonnais Forfaiting, another subsidiary of Credit 
Lyonnais. In turn, Credit Lyonnais absorbed Credit Lyonnais Forfaiting, 
thereby merging two different titles: creditor and debtor under the 
documentary credit. 
Fraud consisting of forgery of the shipping documents was 
discovered. It should be noted that on the date when fraud was established, 
Credit Lyonnais had not yet made payment under the documentary credit. 
 Credit Lyonnais claimed reimbursement from the issuing bank since 
it had already accepted the drafts drawn on it under the credit when fraud 
was established. It claimed that it should, therefore, be considered as having 
performed its undertaking under the credit and should be entitled to 
reimbursement not withstanding the fraud. The Commercial Court, the Court 
of Appeal and the Court of Cassation rejected Credit Lyonnais’ claim. It 
held that  
Whereas a documentary credit available by acceptance can only be 
considered as executed upon payment of the accepted drafts, a fraud 
established before such payment invalidated the payment obligation of 
the accepting bank under the documentary credit, unless the draft is 
presented by a third party holder in good faith that is not a party to the 
credit.100 
 
                                                 
100 Free translation in the article by Georges Affaki  for  the ICC Newsletter Documentary Credits Insight 
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This shows that the French court enforced the internationally upheld 
rule that no payment is due by a confirming bank under a documentary 
credit when fraud is established before that bank performs its undertaking 
under that credit.101 
 
 
Ways of Preventing and Minimizing Fraud:- 
 
 As mentioned earlier, letters of credit are normally carried out 
between parties that have never even met. Since the fundamental principle 
of LC is that banks pay against documents and are not concerned with the 
underlying transaction, this gives rise to a problem since not all buyers and 
sellers are not always honest , banks may find themselves in a position 
where fraud has been committed and they are forced to pay against 
presented documents. 
 It is said that the most important things to do in order to prevent fraud 
are to know who you are dealing with and to know the business in which 
you are operating.102 The buyer may help himself by simply checking the 
bona fides of the seller before entering into a contract. 
 Normally in fraud cases the victim is the buyer where the goods are 
non existent and the documents presented were forged and the bank had to 
pay, and the buyer had to reimburse the bank since it paid against documents 
which on their face seemed authentic. 
                                                 
101 The other question that the court was faced with was: what moment in time is the confirming bank 
considered to have performed its undertaking under a credit available by acceptance? This is of importance 
because when that point is determined the occurrence of fraud before or after that moment would stop or 
oblige the bank to pay. In the case at hand the court decided that a confirming bank has performed its 
undertaking under a documentary credit available by acceptance when the bank actually pays the draft it 
has previously accepted. Thus the court denied Credit Lyonnais’s entitlement to reimbursement.   
102 Captain P. Mukundan at the International Maritime Bureau as Quoted by Micheal Rowe  in “Letters of 
Credit” 2nd edition p.241 
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 A lot of cases go unreported since the buyer would rather face the loss 
than to face public embarrassment. 
In some cases the buyer, wanting to be on a safe side, stipulates in the 
credit for presentation of a document to the bank issued or countersigned by 
him.103 In that case, when the buyer is convinced that the seller has shipped 
the contracted goods he may then issue or countersign the required 
document so that the seller may present the full set of documents to the bank 
and receive his payment. The question that arises here is what happens if the 
buyer refuses to issue such a document and the seller has no way of 
presenting the full set of documents required under the credit? 
 In that case if the seller has already shipped the goods and the buyer 
has obtained property of them then the buyer will be liable to the seller for 
the price. In addition, the court may be prepared to imply into the contract a 
term that states that the parties will co-operate to ensure the performance of 
their bargain. Failure of the buyer to issue or countersign such a document 
will be treated as a breach of such a term and he will be liable to the seller in 
damages.104 
 Another method is the certificate of inspection. Where the buyer and 
the seller agree on a third party to inspect the goods before they are shipped 
to confirm the quality of the goods, and that party is required to issue a 
certificate which will be one of the documents required by the bank for 
payment. The method of paying this third party is according to the 
agreement between the parties. There are a number of internationally known 
firms that do this, for example Lloyd’s. 
                                                 
103 Normally no person would accept this since it means that the payment will be in the hands of the 
applicant. 
104  Gutteridge and Megrah’s  Law of Bankers’ Commercial Credits op cit p. 50 
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  In order to minimize and prevent commercial crime, the ICC has set 
up three units called the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the 
Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, and the Commercial Crime Bureau. The 
major part of their work is to provide businesses with the type of knowledge 
that would help to introduce precautionary procedures. 
 These are all remedies or ways to minimize the possibility of fraud. 
But if fraud has already been committed then there are remedies available. 
For example, compensation through the criminal process. But although this 
is available very few successful prosecutions are ever brought, partially 
because of jurisdictional problems. In is more successful and profitable 
using the civil law and attempt to trace and freeze the assets of the 
beneficiary, or require an injunction to stop the beneficiary from dealing 
under the LC. 
 As mentioned earlier, the bank has the right or is actually under the 
duty to reject the documents if they are discrepant. In which case the bank 
refuses to accept the documents, state each discrepancy, and either holds the 
documents and approaches the applicant for a waiver of the discrepancies, or 
return the documents to the presenter.105 
 What is the position of the seller in cases where he is denied payment 
under the credit, either for presenting discrepant documents or in some cases 
for the bank being insolvent? It is a known fact that letters of credit are 
actually conditional and not absolute payment. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
105 Article 16(a) UCP 600 
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2/ Illegality Exception to The Independence Principle: 
 
The most recognizable exception is the fraud exception; some lawyers 
in the United City Merchants106 even went to the extent of alleging that the 
only accepted exceptionto the independence principle is fraud. 
Although the illegality exception is not as highlighted as the fraud 
exception, it is still one of the defences or exceptions which look beyond the 
letters of credit to the underlying agreement between the parties, and thus an 
exception to the independence principle. 
The most important case considering this exception is the United City 
Merchants (Investments) Limited and Glass Fibres and Equipment Ltd v. 
Royal Bank of Canada, Vitrorefuerzos S.A and Banco Continental S.A.107  
When deciding the case Mocatta J. separated the hearings based on 
the two different aspects of the case, the fraud exception108, and illegality. 
The illegality aspect of the case arose when it was argued that the transaction 
in question was in part a monetary transaction in disguise. In the financial 
agreement between the parties the amounts invoiced for goods sold and 
delivered were inflated by a margin of 100%. Vitro intended to take to itself 
almost one half of the amounts to be paid in the form of dollars paid to an 
account in Miami, in order to transfer funds out of Peru, which was contrary 
to the exchange control regulations of the Peruvian government, and thus 
alleged to be a monetary transaction in disguise.  
Since both countries, Peru and Britain, were signatories to the Bretton 
Woods Agreement, it would be a violation of Britain’s undertaking in terms 
                                                 
106 Infra p.31 
107  (1983) AC 168 
108 Infra p.31 
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of the Agreement.109 Thus, the argument that the court was obliged to refuse 
to enforce the transaction. 
Counsel for the bank readily accepted the proposition that the 
transaction could not be divided, that the good part of the transaction which 
was considered legal in accordance to the exchange control regulations of 
the Peruvian government could not be separated from that which was 
considered illegal, and that accordingly, the Court should refuse to enforce 
the entire transaction. 
 
Queen’s Bench Decision:- 
 
Mocatta J. was of the opinion that the parties had inflated the purchase 
price in respect of the goods, and that the buyer would have repaid to the 
seller 50% of the value invoiced in US dollars. He further held that the 
purchasers were quite willing to ignore such a transaction.  
He then approached the subject of the independence principle, the 
documents presented were on their face compliant and conforming 
documents, allowing a defence of illegality would be considered a further 
exception to the independence principle. 
Mocatta J. refused to enforce the terms of the letter of credit. He 
furthermore, refused to sever the agreement, and thus refused to enforce 
payment of the portion of purchase price which was not objectionable. He 
held that it was not possible to sever the agreement, and thus undertook not 
to enforce the whole of the agreement. 
                                                 
109 Article 8 of the Bretton Woods Agreement provides that any such exchange contracts involving the 
currency of any member, and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of the member, shall 
be unenforceable in the territories of any member. 
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The decision was subsequently appealed before the Court of 
Appeal. 
 
Court of Appeal Decision:- 
 
The counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the court must uphold the 
independence principle and look only to the letters of credit, and not the 
underlying transaction. It was argued that even if the underlying transaction 
was an exchange contract, this should not render the letter of credit 
unenforceable. It was further argued in the alternative that the part of the 
transaction which was not objectionable should have been enforced. 
It was also alleged that the only accepted exception to the 
independence principle was fraud. The respondent’s attorneys, on the other 
hand, suggested that it was wrong to look at a letter of credit in isolation of 
the underlying transaction when considering whether or not a letter of credit 
is to be enforced. The counsel argued that if in fact the letter of credit was 
enforced despite the fact that the underlying agreement was unenforceable 
due to provisions of the Bretton Woods Agreement, this would in effect 
make the Agreement ineffective. 
Stephenson L.J. gave the judgment of the court, he found sufficient 
grounds to hold that the present transaction partly constituted an exchange 
control transaction, and furthermore that it violated the exchange control 
regulations of Peru. He then considered whether he was bound to ignore the 
exchange control violation on the basis of the independence principle. In 
other words, whether the Court should look beyond the letter of credit and 
look to the underlying transaction which constituted the exchange control 
 63
violation, and thus refuse to apply the independence principle and 
accordingly refuse to enforce the letter of credit.110 
He, therefore, came to the conclusion that, “The Court could carry out 
its double duty in this case by enforcing the part of the agreement which 
does not offend against the law of Peru, and refusing to enforce the part of it 
which is a disguised monetary transaction by which currencies were 
exchanged in breach of law.” 
The Court thus agreed with the view of the Court of Appeal, that there 
is nothing in the Bretton Woods Agreement that prevents the payment under 
the documentary credit being enforceable to the extent that the payment was 
legal. It accordingly gave judgment in favour of the sellers, for that part of 
the transaction which was not a monetary transaction in disguise. 
As mentioned earlier, illegality is not a much known exception to the 
independence principle, so there are not so many reported cases concerning 
this exception. However, there is a case that is some what recent: 
 
Mahonia Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank (2003)111 
 
The facts of the case are as follows, on 28th of September 2001, 
Mahonia, the beneficiary, Chase Bank, the presenting bank, and Enron 
North American Corp. (ENAC), the applicant, undertook three swap 
transactions, which were circular in nature. This was a cosmetic device to 
provide Enron Corporation with a loan of US$350 million which Enron did 
not have to record in its accounts as a debt. This was in breach of the US 
                                                 
110 International trade requires the enforcement of letters of credit, but international comity requires the 
enforcement of the Bretton Woods Agreement. 
 
111 Leading Court Cases on Letters of Credit by King Tak Fung , ICC publications Chapter 7 
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securities and other laws. As a condition of entering into these three swaps, 
Chase required Enron to provide security by way of two LCs issued in 
favour of Mahonia for a total amount of US$315 million. 
The issuing bank, West LB AG, issued an irrevocable transferable 
standby LC effective 9th of October 2001, available at sight for US$165 
million. Another LC for US$150 million was provided by a syndicate of 
banks led by Chase. On 2nd of December 2001, Enron filed for voluntary 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On 5th of December 2001, Chase presented the 
documents on behalf of Mahonia and demanded payment. West LB refused 
to make payment, probably because Enron has entered bankruptcy 
proceedings. However, neither on the date of presentation nor on the last 
date for making payment was West LB aware of the details of the swap 
transactions, nor did it have clear evidence that the transaction was illegal. In 
the subsequent proceedings, the Bank claimed illegality as its defence to the 
beneficiary’s claim for payment under the LC. Mahonia initiated this action 
to strike out West LB’s illegality defence. 
West LB alleged that both the LCs and the swaps were entered into 
for illegal purposes, that of providing a structure upon which Enron’s 
misleading accounts were founded. The question that arose here was 
whether the English courts could refuse to enforce the contracts whose 
purpose was to commit an act that was considered illegal in a foreign 
country.112 The court held that it could in fact refuse to enforce these 
contracts because the enforcement of such contracts would be contrary to 
public policy. The judge said: 
                                                 
112 The US securities law requires the loan of Enron to be recorded in its accounts as a debt, and by Enron 
failing to do so it was in breach if the US securities law but this is not considered illegal under the English 
law. 
 65
“Enron’s purpose in procuring the opening of the letter of credit, 
being to enable it to provide to Chase the security necessary to create 
by means of the three swaps a device for deceiving the SEC (of the 
US) and the public, the court would have held that to enforce the 
contract would be contrary to public policy.” 
       But the main question was whether Mahonia could strike out the 
illegality defence and obtain a summary judgment against West LB. The 
judge summarized the case as follows: 
 
“If a beneficiary should as a matter of public policy (ex turpi causa) 
be precluded from utilizing a letter of credit to benefit from his own 
fraud, it is hard to see why he should be permitted to use the courts to 
enforce part of an underlying transaction which would have been 
unenforceable on grounds of its illegality if no letter of credit had 
been involved, however, serious the material illegality involved. To 
prevent him doing so in an appropriately serious case such as one 
involving international crime could hardly be seen as a threat to the 
life blood of international commerce. 
In the present case, I have therefore come to the conclusion that on the 
assumed facts there is at least a strongly arguable case that the letter 
of credit cannot be permitted to be enforced against the defendant 
bank. That represents at the very least a realistic prospect of success 
for the bank’s defence based on this point. Furthermore, the 
conclusion as to whether enforcement is permissible at least arguably 
depends on the gravity of the illegality alleged… the fact that the bank 
did not have clear evidence of such illegality at the date when 
payment had to be made would not prevent it having a good defence 
 66
on that basis if such clear evidence were to hand when the Court was 
called upon to decide the issue. For this purpose, I proceed on the 
basis that it now has sufficiently clear evidence as expressed in the 
pleading. 
Accordingly, the claimant’s application to strike out the illegality 
defence and for summary judgment in respect of that defence will be 
dismissed. ”    
      
        The documentary credits and its independence principle have been 
adopted to facilitate the international commerce. But if the letter of credit 
transaction involved an international crime it could hardly be seen as a threat 
to the lifeblood of international trade to adopt the illegality as an exception. 
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3 Mistake:- 
 
Unlike the fraud exception, this one is concerned with the law of 
contract not with the law of commercial credits. 
There are three types of mistake:    
1 common mistake: in which both parties make the same mistake. 
Each one of the parties knows the intention of the other party and 
accepts it, but each is mistaken about some underlying and 
fundamental principal, for example they are both unaware of the fact 
that the subject matter of the contract has perished. Lord Atkins 
approached the common mistake issue by saying: 
“Mistake as to the quality of the thing contracted for raises 
more difficult questions. In such a case a mistake will not affect 
assent unless it is a mistake of both parties, and is as to the 
existence of some quality which makes the thing without the 
quality essentially different from the thing as it was believed to 
be.”113 
 Through the interpretations of what the judges have said and done in a 
number of cases it appears that they have decided that a common mistake 
has no effect unless it is of such significance as to eliminate the subject 
matter of the agreement. Once this has been decided, the contract is 
considered void. Since the very nature of the contract of sale presupposes the 
existence of goods capable of delivery.114 
 2 mutual mistake: in which both parties misunderstand each other and 
are at different positions, that is to say that each party is mistaken as to the 
                                                 
113 In Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd (1932) p. 218 as quoted by John N Adams and Roger Brownsword's 
Understanding Contract Law p.130  
114Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, Law of Contract p.255 
 68
other’s intention and neither party realises the misunderstanding.  For 
example A intends to offer his Mercedes car for sale, while B believes that 
the offer relates to the BMW which is also owned by A. In such a case both 
parties have given genuine consent, but the issue that arises is not what the 
parties intended, but what a reasonable third party would infer from their 
words or conduct. 
The court has to take the position of the third party and decide 
whether a sensible third party would take the agreement to mean what A 
understood it meant or what B understood it to mean, or in some cases 
whether any meaning could be made out of it at all. As Blackburn J put it: 
“if whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself 
that a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms 
proposed by the other party, and that the other party upon that belief 
enters into the contract with him, the man thus conducting himself 
would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other 
party’s terms”115 
 
This means that if a reasonable man would infer from the wording and 
conduct of the parties that a contract exists, then the court, not withstanding 
a material mistake, will hold that a contract in that sense is binding to both 
parties.116 
 
3 Unilateral mistake: in this case only one of the parties is mistaken. 
The most distinguishing feature of this type of mistake is that the mistake of 
                                                 
115 Smith v. Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597   
116 Of course there are some cases were it is impossible make a reasonable assumption that a definite 
agreement between the parties has been reached, the evidence would be so conflicting that a third party has 
nothing solid to make an assumption upon. In such a case the court will declare that no contract what so 
ever has been created. 
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the first party is known to the other party117. It should be noted that a man is 
taken to have known what would have been obvious to a reasonable person 
in the light of the surrounding circumstances.118  
Most cases of unilateral mistake are cases of mistaken identity. A 
clear example of this is when A, pretending to be X, makes an offer to B, 
which B accepts believing that A is in fact X. Later on B alleges that he 
would not have accepted the offer had he known A’s true identity. If this 
allegation is proved and B’s intention was known to A at the time of the 
acceptance, then there is no correspondence between offer and acceptance 
and therefore there is no contract. On the other hand, outward appearances 
can not be neglected since a contract had been concluded between the 
parties. The onus of rebutting this presumption lies upon the party that 
pleads mistake. He has to prove that: 
a he intended to deal with some person other than the person with 
whom he in fact made a contract, 
b the latter was aware of his intention, 
c at the time of negotiations the identity of the other contracting party 
was of importance to him, 
d reasonable steps were taken by him in order to verify the identity of 
that party. 
 
As mentioned earlier this exception is related to the contract law and 
not to the law of commercial credits. But the bank may refuse to pay if the 
credit was issued as a result of a contract that contains a mistake on behalf of 
both parties. In addition to that, the bank may refuse to pay if the credit was 
                                                 
117 If the other second party is ignorant of the first party’s mistake then it would be considered a mutual 
mistake. 
118 Law of Contract op cit p.66, p.253 and 274 
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issued by reason of a unilateral mistake of the bank and the seller was aware 
of the mistake so that he draws against the credit in bad faith.119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 Gutteridge and Megrah’s op cit p. 8,p. 84 
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Chapter Four 
 
Conclusion 
 
 “The life blood of commerce”, this is how English judges have 
described letters of credit. Without this invaluable mechanism the 
international exchange of goods could not be carried out. Letters of credit 
are the creation of merchants and bankers. They are the common and 
universally used method of payment in international business transactions. 
 Everything in the Letter of Credit system turns to the documents. If 
they conform then the bank has to pay, even in most cases of fraud if the 
goods are worthless. If a single document is missing but the goods are 
perfect the seller cannot require the bank to pay, although he may have a 
right to claim directly from the buyer. In a nutshell, this is what the 
mechanism of LC is based on, and this is what this thesis discussed “The 
Independence Principle and Its Exceptions”. 
Despite what most people think an LC is not an absolute form of 
payment, as the previous chapters have shown there are exceptions. For 
example, if fraud is apparent on the face of the documents then the doctrine 
of strict conformity does not apply. Different jurisdictions have different 
approaches to the fraud exception. The English courts, for example, have 
been zealous in this respect. When dealing with the UCP and the 
independence principle the English judges are very conservative. They are 
very cautious when applying exceptions to the Independence Principle. Its 
there opinion that injunctions should not be issued frequently and the 
independence principle should be dealt with carefully. One has yet to come 
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across a case where an English judge has issued an injunction to stop 
payment under the letter of credit. 
 On the other hand, the American approach is so much wider, that it 
covers fraud which has been committed in the underlying transaction. 
Furthermore, the American approach differs from the English one in that 
even if the fraud is committed by a third party it is ground enough to refuse 
payment. Meanwhile the English courts are of the opinion that the fraud has 
to be committed by the beneficiary. If it were committed by a third party and 
the beneficiary had no knowledge of the fraud then that does not give rise to 
the fraud exception. 
Perhaps the difference between the American approach and the 
English one derives from the fact that in the United States American courts 
have wider interpretations. In addition to the UCP, they use the UCC. Its 
importance is apparent in two major points. The first is the method in which 
it deals with the fraud exception, and most importantly is that it derives its 
importance from it being a statute and not merely uniformed customs as is 
the case with the UCP. The UCC is codified, and all states have adopted it, 
thus it is a statute. While on the other hand the UCP’s application is 
contractual, both parties have to agree to adopt the UCP as the rules that 
govern their transaction. 
The other exception was the illegality exception, it not as widely 
known or even used. The illegality exception is one of the cases where you 
look beyond the letter of credit into the underlying contract. It is one of the 
cases where the underlying contract affects the payment of the letter of 
credit, and by that undermines the independence principle. It is available as 
an exception, but it is not widely used or reported. 
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 It is hard to see that a beneficiary could be able to use the courts in 
order to enforce a payment under a letter of credit, based on the 
independence principle, where the underlying contract is unenforceable due 
to its illegality (if there was no letter of credit involved.) 
As with fraud, the illegality exception is a matter of public policy to 
prevent the beneficiary from using the letter of credit to benefit from his own 
illegality.  
  
 The third exception is the mutual mistake, it is not concerned with the 
law of commercial credits but rather with the law of contract. But none-the-
less it is available as an exception. 
 
 Without the Independence principle the importance of letters of credit 
would diminish. But as it has been discussed earlier, this principle is not and 
cannot be absolute. When recognizing the exceptions discussed earlier it is 
clear that they actually protect the documentary credits from being used as a 
mechanism to defraud people. Thus keeping it as the best option to use a 
method of payment in international trade, and to deserve it name as The Life 
Blood of International Commerce. 
 
 
 
.-----------------------------------------------------------------------. 
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